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This paper assesses European bank deleveraging and its impact on global credit conditions. Before the onset of the global financial crisis, European banks had rapidly expanded their foreign lending activities. However, European banks have since been tightening credit conditions in Europe more for longer-term lending, a trend that banks expect to continue. European financial stress has been transmitted to emerging markets that have experienced a sustained deterioration of credit standards and funding conditions. As a result, European lending in emerging markets has been lagging behind This paper is a product of the Financial Architecture and Banking Systems Unit, Financial and Private Sector Development Network. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http:// econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at efeijen@worldbank.org or igonzalezdelmazo@worldbank.org.
lending of other international banks although European banks remain a dominant source of funding. "Good" bank deleveraging is still necessary from a prudential perspective. Although acute "bad" deleveraging pressures due to financial stress, which can trigger a credit crunch, have subsided recently on account of decisive policy measures, tail risks remain. Curtailing lending will probably be a core component of this multi-year deleveraging process. Taken together, European bank deleveraging warrants close attention.
I. Introduction
Before the subprime mortgage crisis erupted in 2007, European banks had been expanding rapidly on a global scale while hidden systemic risks built up. In the run up to the global financial crisis, European banks significantly increased their lending activities both domestically and outside home markets 3 driven by a pro-cyclical spiral of cheap abundant funding, increasing profitability, and economic growth. In the process, European banks became excessively leveraged and reliant on sources of wholesale short-term funding 4 making them more susceptible to shocks which could force them to adjust their operations abruptly and shrink their balance sheets (Exhibits I.1 and I.2). Moreover, as banks expanded, the build-up of risks and their potential spillover effects to other parts of the world largely escaped supervisors.
When the crisis erupted, a process of bank deleveraging was put into motion. This pre-crisis process of financial expansion and integration has been dramatically put in reverse since the US subprime crisis broke out and imbalances and risk underpricing became apparent. Faced with a new reality, policy makers responded by supporting financial markets and initiated an overhaul of supervisory mechanisms and the international regulatory framework. At the same time, banks reacted by boosting capital, slashing trading assets, reducing excessive lending, focusing on core deposits as a funding source, and realigning their business models.
While bank deleveraging is necessary, excessive deleveraging harbors the risk of negatively affecting global credit conditions especially for longer-term finance 5 . The deleveraging process of shrinking, strengthening, and cleaning up balance sheets is desirable and one of the 2 For details, see ECB (June 2012) and IMF (October 2012) and Section III. 3 European banks not only provided cross-border capital flows, but became increasingly involved in domestic financial markets via lending activities of their local affiliates. 4 For a discussion on European bank funding models, also see Le Lesle (2012) . 5 For conceptual purposes of this paper, "longer-term" is taken to be maturities of at least five years or known to being relatively stable over time. However, in the empirical analysis, the definition will depend on the nature of the available data.
4 objectives of stricter regulatory requirements. Deleveraging will likely need several additional years to bottom out. However, the deleveraging process has also adversely impacted credit conditions around the world which can dampen economic growth ("bad" deleveraging), particularly in Europe where bank credit is the dominant source of funding. This in turn can undermine bank asset quality which worsens credit conditions further. Credit tightening has manifested via availability, pricing, and maturities. As a result, credit has contracted in peripheral European countries and has started to contract more recently in the core (Exhibit I.3). These circumstances have also triggered a steady retreat from non-domestic (lending) activities towards home markets. Since a $24 trillion peak in 2008, European banks have reduced their total foreign claims by over 30 percent (Exhibit I.4), mostly driven by a fall in claims on developed economies.
Although emerging and developing economies (EMDEs) have been hitherto less affected, they remain vulnerable to European bank deleveraging given volatile European financial conditions, the often dominant role of European banks in EMDEs, and the varying capacity of EMDEs to counter-balance the impact. 6 European bank lending to EMDEs have been relatively less affected compared to other developed countries since they are considered to be growth markets and are often small relative to the consolidated parent bank's balance sheet. However, lending growth rates to EMDEs have fallen significantly and even reversed recently, highlighting the difficulties European banks are facing.
While other banks and non-banks have started to fill the gap to various degrees, European bank retrenchment can still be damaging, particularly in bank based economies which are dependent on European banks and where other international banks, stronger banks in developing countries or (local) capital markets are not able to adequately fill the gap. Moreover, although bank "disintermediation" has already taken hold on account of a rally in capital market finance from which large corporates mostly benefited, this trend might not be sustainable and merely reflect a search for yield in the context of extraordinary low returns on safe assets as a result of massive central bank intervention. In addition, disintermediation in which the broad spectrum of credit demand is adequately served will be much more difficult to achieve in financial systems which are strongly bank based such as Europe itself. This contrasts sharply with the US where most credit is intermediated by non-banks. Furthermore, as banks in developing countries try to fill the gap and become more active internationally, EMDE supervisors will be confronted with new cross-border risks which will require a rethinking of their regulatory and crisis management frameworks. An additional concern is that fears of European bank retrenchment have given rise to supervisory measures to "ring fence" capital and liquidity of foreign bank affiliates to protect the domestic financial system. However, this could jeopardize international financial integration and stability in the longer term.
Also, it might prove more difficult for non-European financial institutions to fill the gap in specialized finance (e.g. project finance, export finance) which typically requires more know-5 how and carries longer maturities. In contrast, US, Japanese and other banks have already started to substitute shorter-term trade finance in Asia where European banks had expanded significantly. In the case of project finance, while banks can still offer expertise at origination, they have become less willing to provide funding for the entire life of the loan. As a result, insurers and other non-banks have started to step into this market 7 .
Deleveraging can be particularly damaging if it becomes disorderly. As recent experience has shown, deleveraging can become pernicious to credit conditions if it picks up speed while the scope to raise capital and shrink non-lending assets is limited in the short-term. Although conditions are currently benign due to a range of central bank measures, financial and political tail risks remain which could trigger resurging systemic pressures to deleverage and push banks to collectively accelerate the process and, in a worst-case scenario, trigger a self-reinforcing, supply-driven credit crunch and fire sales with adverse repercussions for financial and economic conditions in Europe and around the world. Given the systemically important role of European banks in Emerging Europe the Vienna Initiative was set up to deal with the fallout of deleveraging.
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The remainder of this note is structured as follows. Section II examines the impact of European bank deleveraging on longer-term credit conditions within Europe and disentangles supply and demand effects. The section also reviews the impact on longer-term finance in emerging and developing economies. Section III discusses the deleveraging outlook, including various asset shedding estimates. Section IV considers deleveraging mechanisms and drivers in the context of recent (policy) developments. Section V describes the main transmission channels of European financial stress to emerging markets and how their lending conditions have been affected. Section VI provides an analysis of European bank lending activity and terms outside the Euro Area, with a focus on emerging and developing markets. It also aims to separate supply from demand effects. Long-term loans Short-term loans 8 banks mostly readjusted prices to tighten the supply of credit and promptly correct for pre-crisis risk underpricing where margins were falling precipitously. More recently, margins continue to be the instrument of choice to restrict credit conditions, but there is also a significant role for shortening maturities, and decreasing loan size. 
Combined

Emerging and developing economies
As regards foreign lending activities, international banks have scaled back longer-term finance in favor of shorter maturities-it is likely this has also been the case for European banks. There is no direct information available on the maturity structure of European bank claims in emerging markets. However, the BIS provides data on maturities of international European banks continue to be part of as significant portion of deals in the syndicated loan market in EMDEs, but their volumes have been falling. European banks are very frequent deal participants in the syndicated loan market to EMDEs which includes project finance and 10 International claims are similar to foreign claims but exclude claims of local affiliates in local currency. 11 Also see Section V for a discussion on transmission channels. 12 Branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks have a significant market share in some CEE countries: about 75 per cent in the total assets of the banking system in Hungary and Latvia and close to 90 per cent in Romania. Non-EU lenders EU lenders 13 once again given that key fault lines 18 that gave rise to the Euro Area crisis are not yet sufficiently addressed and significant financial market and political tail risks remain compounded by recessionary conditions.
In the medium term, it is necessary for European banks to deleverage further as they remain highly levered and reliant on wholesale funding, despite some progress made since 2008 (Exhibits I.1 and I.2). In a recent Deloitte survey, more than 70 percent of European banks indicated that deleveraging will take an additional 5 to 7 years. 19 A protracted deleveraging process is also consistent with past crisis experiences in which credit growth resumed after several years of a stagnant or negative trend (Exhibit III.1). Similarly, at the onset of various past crises, loan-to-deposit ratios were over 100 percent and often fell precipitously for many years before reaching more sustainable levels (Exhibit III.2). These patterns are also more broadly confirmed by past economy-wide deleveraging processes. These episodes can be characterized by a first phase of debt reduction and deleveraging of corporations, households, and financial institutions while the economy is negative and government debt rises. In the second phase, growth is restored and government debt is gradually reduced 20 (McKinsey Global Institute (2012)).
Deleveraging can affect credit conditions and loan growth, given that the effectiveness of other deleveraging options is currently more limited. Deleveraging may mostly occur to an important degree via the asset side as liability-side options currently appear to have been largely exhausted or limited due to adverse market valuations and economic conditions, as described earlier. Indeed, over 40 percent of the surveyed European banks have indicated they will deleverage and de-risk by naturally running off their assets, divestments, and constraining asset growth (Exhibit III.3). Most banks also indicate that loan portfolios are an important target of their divestment plans, although weak economic conditions might inhibit this (Exhibit III.4). Since the EU financial sector is more bank based than its US counterpart, the risks of "bad" deleveraging may therefore have worse consequences for the European economy. Small and medium enterprises-which constitute 99 percent of all EU firms-could be most vulnerable given a lack of alternate sources of financing.
Moreover, offloading loan portfolios to non-bank parts of the financial sector could harbor new risks and sow the seeds for future financial instability. In the current low interest rate environment, investors have been searching for yield which resulted in a drop of risk assets yields and an increase in capital flows to emerging markets. 21 Various financial corporations 18 While the European Monetary Union introduced a common monetary framework, member nations mostly retained discretionary powers over a wide range of financial, fiscal, and economic policies which gave rise to imbalances. Policy makers have started to address this dichotomy by taking the first steps towards greater integration. 19 Deloitte (2012) . 20 There is some empirical evidence which suggests the impact of a financial crisis on potential output can have long-term effects, particularly when the crisis was severe (Furceri and Mourougane (2009) ). 21 The high-yield market in the US has rallied since September 2012 and investor demand for some securitized products is back.
14 such as asset management companies and insurers have been preparing to invest in bank loan portfolios as they are offloaded due to deleveraging pressures. Banks could also shift exposures to non-bank entities within the group.
III.1 Based on past crisis experience, Euro Area credit could likely decline for a prolonged period…
III.2 … and dependence on wholesale funding will need to decrease as well Evolution of Post-Crisis Nominal Private Credit Start of crisis=T indexed at 100
Evolution of Post-Crisis Loan-to-Deposit Ratios % (Start of crisis=T) Sources: IMF; ECB Sources: IMF; ECB In terms of magnitude, the most recent deleveraging projections are significant and point to a reduction between 5 and 10 percent of total European bank assets, although they should be seen as illustrative only since they are shrouded by market and policy uncertainties and data gaps. 22 In October 2012, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Finland (91) Spain (08) Sweden (91) UK (08) USA (07 adjusted its baseline deleveraging estimates upward from $2.6 to $2.8 trillion by end-2013. 23 In June 2012, the ECB produced a more conservative estimate of $2.1 trillion or €1.6 trillion (Exhibit III.5). These numbers are consistent with plans banks announced in 2011 which sum up to a multi-year asset reduction of over €2 trillion.
III.3 Many European banks will deleverage via runoffs, divestments, and constraining asset growth…
III.4 … and will mainly target loan portfolios in their divestment strategies How European banks plan to deleverage % of respondents rating these items 4 or 5 on a 1-5 scale
Which assets European banks are likely to divest % of respondents rating these items 4 or 5 on a 1-5 scale
Credit outside the Euro Area could be hit disproportionately-the IMF estimates as much as $400 billion could be affected, twice as much as in the Euro Area. This figure is consistent with an illustrative World Bank estimate of $500 billion in emerging markets which was derived by simulating a reduction of the simple asset-to-equity ratio of European banks from 18 to 12 times, assuming i) they are not able to raise any equity and ii) conduct the required asset reduction to reach the target ratio for 50 percent via their loan books (Exhibit III.6). 
IV. Deleveraging Mechanisms and Drivers
European banks are confronted with various deleveraging options which could affect lending, particularly longer-term credit. There are several ways for banks to delever and derisk their balance sheets. Via the liability side, banks can boost capital by issuing equity, converting debt to equity, and buy back their own bonds if they trade at a discount. They can also increase retained earnings by raising prices, reducing dividends, and cutting costs. Via the asset side, banks can reduce their (risk-weighted) size by scaling back activities with higher risk weights and shedding assets including non-core operations and trading assets, reducing lending 23 IMF (October 2012). 24 For details, see Feyen, Kibuuka, and Otker-Robe (2012) . The simulation targets a reduction of the simple asset to equity ratio of European banks from around 18-20 times to 12 times. The necessary adjustment is assumed to impact emerging market credit proportionately. The geographical distribution of European bank credit is taken from the IMF's Financial Soundness Indicators. by not replacing maturing loans with new ones (run-offs) or outright offloading loans from their balance sheets. As part of the deleveraging process, banks can also strengthen their liquidity and funding positions by attracting more (retail) deposits and longer-term funding to better absorb shocks. However, more stable funding comes at a cost and could make longer-term lending less attractive.
The main deleveraging drivers can be categorized into three groups: financial, regulatory, and economic.
Financial drivers
Tight funding conditions (i.e. higher costs or lower availability) inhibit lending operations and depress profitability, particularly because European banks are dependent on short-term wholesale funding and have large uncovered financing needs-€1.7 trillion in the next three years. These tight conditions have already manifested in several ways and peaked after the Lehman collapse in September 2008 and at the end of 2011 when the European sovereign debt crisis intensified.
• Tightening interbank and debt issuance conditions: Interbank and unsecured debt markets became increasingly impaired in terms of volumes, pricing, and maturities (Exhibit IV.1). As the Euro Area crisis deepened, these factors were compounded by an adverse feedback loop between solvency and funding conditions of banks and their sovereigns. More recently, funding markets have become increasingly more domesticated as Euro Area breakup fears took hold and economic conditions worsened. Weaker banks are virtually shut off from private funding markets and have become increasingly more dependent on the ECB. As funding maturities fell, it became more difficult to originate new longer-term loans and roll-over existing ones.
• Tightening dollar funding conditions: European banks were forced to restructure and shrink their sizeable dollar-denominated operations such as trade finance due to evaporating dollar funding including from US money market funds and costs to swap euros into dollars soared (Exhibit IV.2). The volatile dollar funding outlook has also made longer-term dollardenominated assets such as project finance less attractive (see Section II).
• Deposit outflows: Some peripheral European countries exhibited significant outflows deposits which are usually more stable, cheaper sources of funding. This has further weakened their liquidity positions.
• Financial fragmentation: As LTRO liquidity effects wore off in 2012, European banks with international operations became increasingly concerned about Euro Area break up and sovereign insolvency risks which prompted them to match assets and liabilities on the national level reinforcing financial fragmentation and a home bias trend. European banks have retreated from other European countries by $5.5 trillion, from a $13.9 trillion peak in early 2008, representing a 40 percent decline (Exhibit I.4).
As observed above, there has been a strong policy response to address impaired bank funding markets. To avoid an extreme funding and fire sale scenario at the end of 2011, the ECB provided massive liquidity support in the form of two exceptional 3-year LTROs worth over €1 trillion. The ECB also lowered reserve requirements, substantially loosened collateral requirements, and set up currency arrangements with other central banks to address poor foreign exchange funding conditions. 
IV.1 Interbank funding conditions deteriorated
Regulatory drivers
First, a much needed stricter international regulatory environment has triggered mediumterm deleveraging which aims to put the financial sector on a strong footing. The new Basel III frameworks call for higher capital and liquidity requirements which will gradually be phased in over the next years to accommodate the adjustment process and avoid disorderly deleveraging. 25 These measures are intended to strengthen and shrink the banking sector in order to make it more stable (i.e. "good" deleveraging). A recent survey of European banks found that a large majority of banks indicated higher capital and liquidity requirements as the main drivers of deleveraging and divestment plans. 26 Consistent with this finding, a recent ECB bank lending survey finds that regulatory requirements-Basel III, but particularly the short-term recapitalization directive by the European Banking Authority (EBA) in addition to national measures-have prompted banks to deleverage on both sides of the balance sheet and has already tightened credit conditions, particularly for large firms (Exhibits IV.3 and IV.4). Basel III was mostly designed with developed banking systems in mind although there is widespread support under EMDEs for its objectives. However, the new regulatory framework might have 25 There are additional considerations and implications of deleveraging for "too big to fail" institutions and global Systemically Important Financial Institutions (GSIFIs) (e.g. Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson (2012)). 26 Deloitte (2012) . The survey included 18 large European financial institutions representing €11 trillion in assets. unintended consequences for financial systems of EMDEs. As one example, new risk weights, differences in risk measurement of parent banks and their subsidiaries, and stricter capital requirements may exacerbate the deleveraging process and disproportionately affect lending operations in EMDEs. However, as the implementation process is still ongoing, full impact assessments are not yet feasible.
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• Higher and better capital: From the capital side, higher regulatory capital requirements induce banks to boost and enhance capital for each unit of risk-weighted assets. Basel IIIimplemented under the Capital Requirements Directive IV in Europe-dictates that banks achieve significantly higher capital levels coming into force in 2013 and be fully phased in by 2019. The latest available estimate of the aggregate capital shortfall is €478.9 billion which is based on December 2011 data and assumes full Basel III implementation per that date.
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• Capital charges for market risk: Basel 2.5 has brought higher capital charges for market risks in banks' trading operations, which may make these assets less attractive investment opportunities and could trigger de-risking and deleveraging of trading books. Second, European banks face several Euro-Area-specific regulatory conditions.
• EBA capital exercise: In addition to adjusting to Basel III, European banks were required by the European Banking Authority (EBA) to raise their Core Tier 1 ratios to 9 percent by June 2012 after accounting for an additional buffer against sovereign risks in their portfolios. Most European banks achieved the target ratio by end-June 2012 and have boosted their capital by over €200 billion since December 2011. 30 The EBA recently announced banks are required to conserve the absolute amount of capital they have accumulated.
• State-aid conditions: In 2009, the European Commission required that "banks benefitting from state aid may be required to divest subsidiaries and branches, portfolios of customers or business units…" to minimize competitive distortions and cost to the tax payer. Several banks have still not finalized this clean-up process of their balance sheets and the shedding of legacy assets.
• Additional national regulatory measures: Banks have also been subject to additional regulatory requirements by national regulators including ring fencing of foreign bank operations. Yet, while these measures aim to protect the domestic financial system, they also contribute to further financial fragmentation of the European financial system. Banks in peripheral countries may also have been compelled to participate in domestic sovereign bond markets to substitute for foreign capital flight crowding out lending activity in the process.
Economic drivers
• Economic slowdown: Significant economic slowdown in the Euro Area, in part a result of front-loaded austerity programs, depresses bank asset growth and profitability which undermines the capacity of banks to boost retained earnings. Moreover, going forward the global economic slowdown impedes the expansion and profitability of foreign operations.
• Sovereign-bank-real economy feedback loop: The negative bank-sovereign-real economy feedback loop that became apparent during the European sovereign debt crisis has not yet been broken. In fact, it has intensified due to the domestication of sovereign debt markets in peripheral countries and reinforced by austerity programs. As such, periods of increased sovereign stress and economic slowdown will continue to impede bank's operations and tighten credit standards. Moreover, European banks have proven to be "international in life and national in death". As such, the current lack of a banking union with appropriate pan-European backstops will perpetuate this feedback loop.
Important policy progress has recently been made to address these factors. To remove break up risk premia from sovereign yields, the ECB announced its OMT program. To date, the effect of the OMT program appears to have been successful and sovereign market stress indicators have improved significantly. Also, concrete steps have been made towards a banking union. However, key differences remain on pan-European deposit insurance and bank resolution. Moreover, as markets have recently rallied in the wake of the OMT program and sovereign yields fall, the incentive to address structural weaknesses may have diminished.
V. Transmission Channels and Emerging Market Credit Conditions
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Banks are often the dominant source of funding in EMDEs. International banks in general and European banks in particular play an important role in financial systems of EMDEs.
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As such, the impact of European bank deleveraging and tighter credit conditions is being directly transmitted to the rest of the world through various channels, including: (i) reduced cross-border claims of European banks on the public, private, and banking sectors of emerging market and developing economies; (ii) sales or downscaling of noncore, nondomestic businesses in host economies; (iii) deleveraging by subsidiaries and branches of foreign banks faced with reduced funding flows from parents, or parent attempts to transfer dividends, capital, or liquidity to headquarters; and (iv) increased cost of borrowing for subsidiaries, either as a result of a general worsening of funding conditions or as investor concerns about parents generate anxiety about the overall health of banking groups. Indirectly, European financial stress is transmitted via lower economic growth, macro, and trade channels.
Accordingly, a country's immediate vulnerability to European bank deleveraging depends on a combination of factors. These include: (i) the size of cross-border claims of European banks relative to the recipient's economy, particularly where local affiliates play a key role in the provision of credit to the private sector but are not systemic to the overall banking group; (ii) the maturity (hence reversibility) of cross-border claims; (iii) whether the local affiliates rely on a wholesale (cross-border) funding model; (iv) the capacity and willingness of other financial institutions-both from developed and developing countries-and markets to step in. European (parent) bank retrenchment could destabilize the local financial system and affect economic activity, especially where host countries lack well-developed capital markets and alternative sources of non-bank financing; and (v) to insulate their financial system, some local supervisors have resorted to "ring-fencing" capital and liquidity of local affiliates of foreign banks or requiring them to invest additional equity in stand-alone subsidiaries. Although these measures will protect the domestic financial system they could ultimately prove harmful for financial integration and stability.
The global crisis has already produced considerable spillover effects to bank credit conditions in the rest of the world (Exhibits V.1 and V.2). Emerging markets began to experience significant tightening of bank credit conditions in 2010 reaching a trough in 2011Q4, particularly in emerging Europe. At that time, all emerging markets across the world indicated their credit standards had been severely affected by European financial turmoil (Exhibit V.3). Especially international funding conditions for emerging markets deteriorated excessively (Exhibit V.4). As discussed above, the ECB LTROs provided welcome relief and overall bank credit conditions, credit standards, and local and international funding conditions continued to tighten in 2012, but to a lesser degree. It also appears the ECB statement to "preserve the Euro whatever it takes" and the launch of the OMT program slowed the tightening pace in funding conditions for the first time since 2012Q2 and has recently slightly loosened. On the demand side, conditions have continued to be expansionary, but at an increasingly slower pace since 2010. Demand was stagnant during end-2011 and has been increasing slightly since 2012Q2 (Exhibit V.3). 
